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      PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_______________ 
 
No. 14-1010 
_______________ 
 
ASHLEY MCMASTER, 
     Appellee 
 
v. 
 
EASTERN ARMORED SERVICES, INC., 
     Appellant 
_______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(Civ. No. 11-5100) 
District Judge: Honorable Michael A. Shipp 
_______________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
October 23, 2014 
 
Before: FUENTES, GREENBERG, and COWEN, Circuit 
Judges 
 
(Opinion Filed:  March 11, 2015) 
 
Mark Justin Gottesfeld 
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R. Andrew Santillo 
Peter D. Winebrake 
Winebrake & Santillo, LLC 
715 Twining Road, Suite 211 
Dresher, PA 19025 
 
Attorneys for Appellee 
 
Christina Vassilou Harvey 
Lomurro, Davison, Eastman & Munoz 
100 Willow Brook Road 
Building 1, Monmouth Executive Center 
Suite 100 
Freehold, NJ 07728 
 
Attorney for Appellant 
_______________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge: 
 The Fair Labor Standards Act requires most employers 
to pay overtime wages to hourly employees. While 
professional motor carriers are generally exempt from this 
requirement, a recent Act of Congress waives the exemption 
for motor carrier employees who, in whole or in part, drive 
vehicles weighing less than 10,000 pounds. Because the 
plaintiff, Ashley McMaster, falls within this carveout, we will 
affirm the District Court’s determination that she was entitled 
to overtime. 
I. 
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 Ashley McMaster worked for Eastern Armored 
Services, Inc. (“Eastern”) from approximately March 2010 
until June 2011. As its name suggests, Eastern is an armored 
courier company, and its fleet of armored vehicles operates 
across several states in the mid-Atlantic region. McMaster 
was a driver and/or guard for Eastern, which meant that some 
days she was assigned to drive an armored vehicle, while 
other days she rode as a passenger to ensure safety and 
security. McMaster was not assigned to one specific vehicle. 
Rather, her vehicle assignment changed according to the 
particular needs of a given day’s transport. As it happened, 
McMaster spent 51% of her total days working on vehicles 
rated heavier than 10,000 pounds, and 49% of her total days 
working on vehicles rated lighter than 10,000 pounds. She 
was paid by the hour, and she frequently worked more than 
40 hours in a given week. For all hours worked, she was paid 
at her regular rate. In other words, she was not paid overtime.  
 
 After McMaster left Eastern, she filed the instant 
federal action claiming that the Fair Labor Standards Act 
required Eastern to pay her overtime wages when she worked 
more than 40 hours in a week. The parties certified a 
conditional class of similarly situated employees, see 29 
U.S.C. § 216(b), and proceeded to limited discovery on 
McMaster’s claim only. The parties then cross-moved for 
summary judgment. Their dispute centered on whether 
Eastern was exempt from paying overtime to McMaster under 
a provision of the Fair Labor Standards Act known as the 
Motor Carrier Act Exemption. According to Eastern, 
McMaster fell within the exemption and was thus not entitled 
to overtime. According to McMaster, she fell within an 
exception to the exemption enacted by Congress prior to her 
employment.  
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 The District Court granted McMaster’s motion, denied 
Eastern’s motion, and entered an order that McMaster was 
eligible to be paid overtime wages for all hours she worked 
over 40 in a given workweek. This interlocutory appeal 
followed on certification of the District Court, see 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1292(b), which recognized that other district courts have 
embraced Eastern’s arguments. In the briefs before us, 
Eastern renews its contention that McMaster is ineligible for 
overtime because of the Motor Carrier Act Exemption.1  
 
II. 
 Section 7 of the Fair Labor Standards Act provides 
that employers must pay hourly employees 150% their typical 
wages on hours they work in a week over 40.2 See 29 U.S.C. 
                                                 
1 Eastern’s alternative argument—that McMaster was entitled 
to overtime only for those workweeks in which she actually 
performed work on vehicles lighter than 10,000 pounds—was 
not presented to the District Court and is therefore deemed 
waived. See Tri–M Grp., LLC v. Sharp, 638 F.3d 406, 416 
(3d Cir. 2011).  
2 We have jurisdiction to review the District Court’s order 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). The District Court had 
subject-matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 
We review a district court's grant of summary judgment de 
novo. Doe v. Indian River Sch. Dist., 653 F.3d 256, 275 n.7 
(3d Cir. 2011). In doing so, we apply the same standard as the 
district court. Id. That is, summary judgment should be 
granted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute 
as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In deciding whether 
summary judgment is warranted, we “must view the facts in 
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§ 207; Packard v. Pittsburgh Transp. Co., 418 F.3d 246, 250 
(3d Cir. 2005). One exemption to this general rule is Section 
13(b)(1) of the Act. Known as the Motor Carrier Act 
Exemption, the provision provides that overtime pay is not 
required for “any employee with respect to whom the 
Secretary of Transportation has power to establish 
qualifications and maximum hours of service.” See 29 U.S.C. 
§ 213(b)(1); see also 49 U.S.C. §§ 31502(b), 13102 (defining 
scope of Secretary of Transportation’s regulatory authority).  
 
 Congress elaborated upon the Motor Carrier Act 
Exemption with the enactment of the Corrections Act of 
2008.3 Section 306(a) of the Corrections Act provides that 
“Section 7 of the Fair Labor Standards Act . . . shall apply to 
a covered employee notwithstanding section 13(b)(1) of that 
Act.” See Corrections Act, § 306(a). Section 306(c) of the 
Corrections Act defines the term “covered employee.” In 
short, a “covered employee” is an employee of a motor carrier 
whose job, “in whole or in part,” affects the safe operation of 
vehicles lighter than 10,000 pounds, except vehicles designed 
to transport hazardous materials or large numbers of 
passengers. Corrections Act § 306(c). 
 
 McMaster’s job placed her squarely within the 
Corrections Act’s definition of a “covered employee.” 
McMaster was a driver and guard of commercial armored 
vehicles, and approximately half of her trips were on vehicles 
                                                                                                             
the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all 
inferences in that party's favor.” Doe, 653 F.3d at 275 n.7. 
3 SAFETEA–LU Technical Corrections Act of 2008, PL 110-
244, June 6, 2008, 122 Stat. 1572. 
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undisputedly lighter than 10,000 pounds.4 Her daily routes 
included interstate trips on public roadways, and none of the 
vehicles were designed to transport eight or more passengers 
or used to transport hazardous materials. And her employer, 
Eastern, is by its own admission a motor carrier. The critical 
issue, then, is the significance of being a “covered employee” 
when determining a motor carrier employee’s entitlement to 
overtime. 
 
 It is well-established that, “[w]here the text of a statute 
is unambiguous, the statute should be enforced as written and 
only the most extraordinary showing of contrary intentions in 
the legislative history will justify a departure from that 
language.” Murphy v. Millennium Radio Grp. LLC, 650 F.3d 
295, 302 (3d Cir. 2011). As stated above, the relevant 
language of the Corrections Act is that, as of June 6, 2008, 
“Section 7 of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 . . . shall 
apply to a covered employee notwithstanding section 13(b)(1) 
of that Act.” Corrections Act § 306(a). This is a plain 
statement that a “covered employee” is to receive overtime 
even where section 13(b)(1)—the Motor Carrier Act 
Exemption—would ordinarily create an exemption. We see 
no plausible alternative construction, and neither Eastern nor 
any of the authorities it cites attempt to offer one. Nor does 
Eastern point to legislative history probative of a drafting 
error. Cf. Murphy, 650 F.3d at 302. Statutory construction 
points to one conclusion: “covered employees” are entitled to 
                                                 
4 We need not now affix a firm meaning to the term “in part.” 
Whatever “in part” means, it is certainly satisfied by 
McMaster, who spent 49% of her days on vehicles less than 
10,000 pounds. 
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overtime. 
 
 District courts considering the plain language of the 
Corrections Act have reached the same conclusion. See, e.g., 
McMaster v. E. Armored Servs., Inc., 2013 WL 1288613, at 
*1 (D.N.J. 2013); Garcia v. W. Waste Servs., Inc., 969 F. 
Supp. 2d 1252, 1260 (D. Idaho 2013); Bedoya v. Aventura 
Limousine & Transp. Serv., Inc., 2012 WL 3962935, at *4 
(S.D. Fla. 2012); Mayan v. Rydbom Exp., Inc., 2009 WL 
3152136, at *9 (E.D. Pa. 2009); Botero v. Commonwealth 
Limousine Serv. Inc., 2013 WL 3929785, at *13 (D. Mass. 
2013); O’Brien v. Lifestyle Transp., Inc., 956 F. Supp. 2d 
300, 307 (D. Mass. 2013). So, too, the Department of Labor, 
in a post-Corrections Act Field Bulletin entitled “Change in 
Application of the FLSA § 13(b)(1) ‘Motor Carrier 
Exemption.’” See Department of Labor Field Bulletin, 
available at http://www.dol.gov/whd/fieldbulletins/fab2010_2.htm.  
(“Section 306(a) extends FLSA Section 7 overtime 
requirements to employees covered by [Corrections Act] 
Section 306(c), notwithstanding FLSA Section 13(b)(1).”).   
 
 Our sister courts of appeals have yet to weigh in 
squarely on whether a Corrections Act “covered employee” is 
entitled to overtime, but the Fifth and Eighth Circuits have 
noted the plain language of the Corrections Act, too.  
 
 In Allen v. Coil Tubing Servs., L.L.C., the Fifth Circuit 
addressed a motor carrier employee’s argument in an 
interlocutory appeal that her lack of interstate driving placed 
her outside the ambit of the Motor Carrier Act Exemption. 
See 755 F.3d 279 (5th Cir. 2014). The Corrections Act was 
not at issue because the relevant claims arose prior to June 
2008. Id. at 291 n.6. In a footnote, however, the court 
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commented on the plaintiff’s other claims before the District 
Court, which arose after the enactment of the Corrections Act. 
Without deciding the issue, the Allen court observed that, 
“although the scope of the [Motor Carrier Act] Exemption to 
the [Fair Labor Standards Act] and the scope of the 
[Department of Transportation]’s regulatory jurisdiction are 
generally one and the same, there may be an exception to that 
rule following passage of the [Corrections Act].” Id. 
Continuing, the court explained that the Corrections Act 
“provides generally that, from the date of the act’s enactment, 
June 6, 2008, the [Motor Carrier Act] exemption does not 
apply to employees who would otherwise fall within its ambit 
if the [“covered employee”] requirements are met.” Id. 
(emphasis in the original). In other words, “covered 
employees” are entitled to overtime. 
 
 The Eighth Circuit case, McCall v. Disabled American 
Veterans, involved a motor carrier employee who, like 
McMaster does here, argued he was eligible for overtime 
because he was a Corrections Act “covered employee.” See 
723 F.3d 962 (8th Cir. 2013). The issue on appeal centered on 
whether the weight of the vehicles the plaintiff drove should, 
for purposes of determining whether he was a “covered 
employee,” be measured according to their actual weight or 
according to their Gross Vehicle Weight Rating. See id. 
Finding the plaintiff was not a “covered employee” because 
he exclusively worked on vehicles with a Gross Vehicle 
Weight Rating over 10,000 pounds, the Eighth Circuit 
explained that “Gross Vehicle Weight Rating establishes an 
objective and predictable standard for determining whether 
the [Motor Carrier Act] Exemption applies.” Id. at 966.  
 
 Rather than contest Congress’s express carveout from 
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the Motor Carrier Act Exemption for “covered employees,” 
Eastern relies on a series of district court cases holding that 
the Motor Carrier Act Exemption remains absolute after the 
Corrections Act. See Avery v. Chariots For Hire, 748 F. 
Supp. 2d 492, 500 (D. Md. 2010); Dalton v. Sabo, Inc., 2010 
WL 1325613, at *4 (D. Or. 2010); Jaramillo v. Garda, Inc., 
2012 WL 4955932, at *4 (N.D. Ill. 2012).5 Each of these 
cases relies on a policy statement of the Seventh Circuit in 
2009 that “[d]ividing jurisdiction over the same drivers, with 
the result that their employer would be regulated under the 
Motor Carrier Act when they were driving the big trucks and 
under the Fair Labor Standards Act when they were driving 
trucks that might weigh only a pound less, would require 
burdensome record-keeping, create confusion, and give rise 
to mistakes and disputes.” See Collins v. Heritage Wine 
Cellars, Ltd., 589 F.3d 895, 901 (7th Cir. 2009). Indeed, our 
own jurisprudence has historically seen the Motor Carrier Act 
Exemption as establishing a strict separation between the 
Secretary of Transportation’s jurisdiction and the ambit of the 
Fair Labor Standards Act overtime guarantee. See Packard, 
                                                 
5 Eastern also points to Buckner v. United Parcel Services, 
Inc., 2012 WL 1596726 (E.D.N.C. May 7, 2012) aff'd without 
opinion, 489 F. App’x 709 (4th Cir. 2012) cert. denied, 134 
S. Ct. 70 (2013), which found a pro se plaintiff ineligible for 
overtime where his job consisted of driving cargo vans 
heavier and lighter than 10,000 pounds. Although the facts of 
Buckner parallel those of this case, there is no indication that 
the pro se plaintiff presented a Corrections Act argument to 
the District Court or the Fourth Circuit, and those courts’ 
decisions do not show consideration of the Corrections Act 
sua sponte.  
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418 F.3d at 254 (rejecting argument that Motor Carrier Act 
Exemption applied only to drivers actually regulated by the 
Secretary of Transportation); Friedrich v. U.S. Computer 
Servs., 974 F.2d 409, 412 (3d Cir. 1992). Neither history nor 
policy, however, can overcome an express change to the 
statutory scheme.6  
 
III. 
 The Corrections Act says it plainly: “Section 7 of the 
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 . . . appl[ies] to a covered 
employee notwithstanding section 13(b)(1) of that Act.” 
Corrections Act § 306(a). As McMaster meets the criteria of a 
“covered employee,” she is entitled to overtime. We will 
therefore affirm the order of the District Court and remand for 
assessment of wages owed to McMaster and for additional 
proceedings relating to the other members of the conditional 
class. 
                                                 
6 In any event, administrability is not an issue with respect to 
those employees who fall within the Motor Carrier Act 
Exemption but are not actually regulated by the Department 
of Transportation. As our former Chief Judge has noted, 
employees may fall within the Motor Carrier Act Exemption 
even where their work presents no reason for Department of 
Transportation regulation. See Friedrich, 974 F.2d at 421 
(Sloviter, C.J., dissenting) (“[T]he driving done by these 
plaintiffs does not raise safety concerns any different than 
those raised by sales or repair persons who carry no such 
equipment. We are not dealing with truckers or bus operators 
here. The DOT itself recognized this distinction when it 
decided not to regulate lightweight vehicles such as 
automobiles.”). 
